





In 2015, the US Congress passed legislation entitled the Medicare Access and CHIP [Children’s Health Insurance Program] Reauthorization Act (MACRA), which led to the creation of two reimbursement models: merit-based incentive payment systems (MIPS) and alternative payment models (APMs). These models are the first and most significant step towards shifting the United States health care system from one that practices fee-for-service billing to a system that rewards value care over volume. Highmark, Inc. has recognized the value of these models, and has begun incentivizing providers to participate in value-based health care by offering programs that reimburse providers in a manner similar to MIPS and APMs. This paper will be a review of value-based healthcare, their public health relevance, and how healthcare organizations are incentivizing its practice by making value-based healthcare financially feasible for healthcare providers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
 TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u 
1.0	value-based Healthcare	1
2.0	Medicare Access and Chip Reauthorization Act – MACRA	4
2.1	Merit-based incentive payment systems – MIPS	5
2.2	Alternative payment models – apmS	7
2.3	Current state of MACRA	8
2.4	MIPS controversies	9
3.0	value-based healthcare Programs at Highmark Inc.	11
3.1	True performance	12
3.2	advanced apms	13
4.0	Maryland All-Payer Hospital Model	15





 TOC \h \z \c "Table" Table 1. Acronyms Referenced	19
Table 2. MIPS Performance Categories	19




Value-based healthcare is a delivery model where providers, including physicians and hospitals, get paid based on the health outcomes of their patients. Value-based care is different from a fee-for-service model in which care providers are paid based on the amount of healthcare services they provide to patients. Value is determined by comparing health outcomes with the costs to deliver those health outcomes. Pay-for-performance is another term that is often used interchangeably with value-based healthcare. Where value-based healthcare is a considered an overarching concept, pay-for-performance is a specific practice done by health insurance companies when they reimburse providers for meeting quality targets. 
The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), Catalyst identifies five key benefits of value-based healthcare delivery. The first benefit is patients spend less money to achieve better health outcomes. This stems from the fact that managing chronic diseases like cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), or diabetes are extremely costly ventures. As of 2010, treating patients with chronic conditions accounts for 86% of healthcare spending in the United States (Multiple Chronic Conditions Chartbook, 2010). Therefore value-based healthcare models focus on recovering from smaller illnesses and injuries faster in an attempt to prevent an individual from getting a chronic disease in the first place. When chronic diseases are avoided, individuals endure fewer doctor’s visits, medical procedures, and spend less money on often expensive prescription drugs (NEJM Catalyst, 2017). 
Another benefit of value-based healthcare is providers achieve efficiencies and greater patient satisfaction. As mentioned above, providers will spend less time managing chronic diseases in patients when they emphasize prevention. Value-based care models can even allow for-profit providers to generate higher value care that is also profitable using metrics that evaluate quality and patient engagement. This allows them to give their patients quality time that was not economically feasible under a fee-for-service model that incentivized providers to spend as little time with a patient as legally possible before moving to the next patient (NEJM Catalyst, 2017).
Third, health insurance companies acting as payers of healthcare, control costs and reduce risk by spreading it over a large patient population. As a payer, keeping patient populations healthier means fewer claims which keeps a payer’s premium pool from being exhausted. Value-based payment encourages bundling of payments, which encourages efficiency. An example of a bundled payment would be if a person is suffering from kidney failure or renal disease and they need dialysis. Instead of having a list of different codes for procedures that are involved with treating renal disease, there would be one code for renal disease that would allot a hospital a pre-determined amount of money. It is then up to the hospital to decide how they spend that money. If the hospital provides the standard of care for less than they were allotted, they get to keep the money. This is the incentive. However, if the hospital goes over that allotted amount, they will often be required to pay a penalty, and be responsible for paying the extra amount (NEJM Catalyst, 2017). This concept will be covered in greater detail later in the essay. 
Fourth, suppliers align prices with patient outcomes. This is particularly important for pharmaceutical companies that can manufacture and sell low-efficacy drugs at similar prices as high-efficacy drugs. Many health care industry stakeholders have been demanding pharmaceutical companies to base their drug prices off the value they have to patients. Numerous positives are created when prices are linked to patient outcomes (NEJM Catalyst, 2017). 
Lastly, society becomes healthier while reducing overall healthcare spending. The United States currently spends nearly 18% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on healthcare, which is more than any other country in the world, but we do not have the best health outcomes. Value-based healthcare has the ability to dramatically reduce how much the United States spends on healthcare without reducing the quality of care. When prevention is the focal point for providers, all players in the health care system spend less money on hospitalizations and medical emergencies that stem from preventable chronic diseases (NEJM Catalyst, 2017). 
Value-based healthcare can come in different forms, and this paper will focus on Value-Based Purchasing done by providers and reimbursement by payers. However, other forms such as Accountable Care Organizations will be mentioned. Shifting healthcare towards value was long seen as just a dream with no real way to be actualized. That all changed when MACRA was implemented as the first major legislation since the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) formula that meaningfully reformed how providers and provider practices could be reimbursed for the care they delivered to Medicare patients. MACRA paved the way for providers to be reimbursed based on value rather than volume. 
2.0 	Medicare Access and Chip Reauthorization Act – MACRA
In 1997, more than 30 years after Medicare was created, Congress made an attempt to make Medicare sustainable in the United States. This attempt was called the Sustainable Growth Rate formula and was designed to make sure annual increases in Medicare expenditures did not surpass the growth of the GDP of the United States. This was the only way a fee-for-service model could be sustained. The SGR formula was calculated using the following variables: (1) the change in fees charged for physician services, (2) the change in the number of Medicare beneficiaries, (3) the average change in real GDP over ten years, and (4) the anticipated increases in expenditures stemming from regulations. These four variables revealed a multiplier used to determine annual payment updates. A drawback to this formula was that it was entirely dependent on the status of the economy. For example, in years where the US economy was prosperous, and GDP was growing, Medicare payments would grow as well. However, if the economy is struggling and does not allow for much GDP growth, the SGR formula causes Medicare reimbursements to plateau or even decrease (Saleh, Shaffer, 2018).
In the first few years of the SGR formula, healthcare expenditures did not grow faster than the economy and Medicare payments were allowed to increase. However, healthcare expenditures continued to grow, and in 2002 costs were growing faster than the economy. Congress recognized that they could not decrease Medicare payments that many providers relied on to keep their practices open, so they passed laws that overrode the SGR formula, so payments would not be decreased. From 2002 to 2014, there were sixteen total bills passed with at least one being passed every year until a final temporary fix was passed in 2014 (Hahn, 2014). So, in 2015, Congress passed MACRA and made additions and modifications to the SGR formula. It started by initiating a Medicare payment update of 0.5% annually from July 2015 through December 2018, meaning that the amount of money the federal government would reimburse for Medicare would automatically increase 0.5% every year through 2018 for the providers and provider groups participating (Saleh, Shaffer, 2018).
This is an improvement from the SGR formula because Medicare reimbursements no longer hinge on the success of the economy. Health care providers now have a financial incentive to shift from the volume-based fee-for-service Medicare model to a value-based system without worrying about losing money on government reimbursements. MACRA does not stop here though. It goes one step further by giving providers the ability to select their method for reimbursement. Providers have the ability to choose either merit-based incentive payment systems (MIPS) or alternative payment models (APMs).
2.1	Merit-based incentive payment systems – MIPS
MIPS operate by offering a performance-based payment adjustment for a provider’s billing of Medicare while allowing providers to continue to be reimbursed under the traditional Medicare fee-for-service model. Table 2 describes the four categories used to evaluate provider performance and gives examples of provider functions that would fit in each of the categories. Data on all four categories was collected in 2017, but only quality, improvement activities, and advancing care information were used to determine provider reimbursement. As of 2018 however, the cost category will be used too. 
Each year, CMS sets a threshold based on the prior year’s data that will determine whether a bonus or penalty is received by providers from scores using the categories described above. Providers that choose to participate in MIPS receive an annual Medicare update of 0.5% in 2019, and plus or minus up to 4% depending on their MIPS score for that year. From years 2020 to 2025, the 0.5% annual update drops to 0%. The annual update goes to 0% because it is hoped that providers will not need to be incentivized to participate. The decrease can also be considered offset by the increased threshold of potential bonuses for MIPS scores. Adjustments can be earned of plus or minus 5% in 2020, 7% in 2021, and 9% in 2022 (Roberts, 2018).
The MIPS program is designed to be budget neutral, which means bonuses and penalties will eventually balance one another. This is also done by using revenue generated from penalties for bonuses at other facilities. Starting in 2019, the maximum positive amount available to be rewarded each year will depend on the number of providers scoring above and below the expected threshold set forth by the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Providers who reach the top 25th percentile in national performance will receive additional yearly adjustments of maximum 10% starting in 2019 and going through 2024. This percentile includes all providers participating in the MIPS program. These incentives are funded by more than $500 million reserved by MACRA for high-value providers across all specialties (Saleh, Shaffer, 2018).
Furthermore, Medicare reserves $100 million for technical assistance to small practices, which includes practices of up to 10 MIPS-eligible professionals, who need assistance to get themselves or their practices in compliance with the MIPS eligibility criteria. Approximately $20 million per year will go to assisting practices of up to 15 professionals to participate in the MIPS program or transition to new payment models from fiscal years 2016 through 2020 (Saleh, Shaffer, 2018).
2.2	Alternative payment models – apmS
Alternative Payment Models, or APMs, are another option for providers to participate in instead of MIPS. This approach gives incentive payments to providers to practice high-quality and cost-effective care. A way APMs and MIPS differ is the populations they apply to. Where MIPS apply to all a provider’s or provider group’s patients, APMs can apply to specific conditions and care episodes. Providers or provider groups participating in select APMs must meet specified payment thresholds. The incentive payments are made in lump sums and on an annual basis. Requirements vary depending on which APM a provider chooses, but a requirement that all participants must be certified to use Electronic Health Record technology is required for all APMs. The APM route requires providers derive 25% of their Part B Medicare beneficiaries through one of these pathways by 2019 to be eligible. This percentage of beneficiaries to be reported to qualify will then increase to 50% by 2022 and again to 75% by 2023. There is no penalty for providers participating in APMs not meeting these target levels, but they may be advised to participate in MIPS instead as it is a less radical option (Saleh, Shaffer, 2018).
APMs also have a subset called Advanced APMs (AAPM) which differ by a 5% incentive offered to participate. If a provider or a group of providers is not eligible for the 5% incentive to become an AAPM, it is commonly referred to as a MIPS APM. If they decide to skip MIPS and participate in an AAPM, they may receive a 5% incentive from Medicare fee schedules for maximum 6 years starting in 2019 and ending in 2025. Existing AAPM programs include Medicare accountable care organizations (ACOs), the Comprehensive Primary Care (CPC) model, or bundled payment models (Roberts, 2018). 
2.3	Current state of MACRA
Since the 2016 election, it has been largely thought that anything related to health care was going to be repealed or try to be repealed. Despite repealing the Affordable Care Act (ACA) being a common theme among campaigning politicians, Ron Shinkman of the NEJM Catalyst believes that MACRA will survive. This belief comes from the fact that it has broad support from both the Republican and Democratic parties in the House and Senate. Despite there being enough support in both political parties and the expected benefits MACRA has to offer, it has never been well received by everyone in the medical community (Shinkman, 2017). Most providers do not support the programs because they feel that the government is forcing them to fundamentally change how they practice medicine. The current administration and members of the House and Senate have been listening to the voices of the disgruntled providers and been working to make modifications to the legislation passed in 2015. The most recent legislative action came when the Senate passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. 
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 was a spending bill passed to end a government shutdown on February 9, 2018. The bill covered a wide variety of items including long-term funding for the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). It also impacted MIPS by lowering the threshold that providers needed to cut costs. When the final rules were released last fall, CMS had planned to have the cost-cutting component of a provider’s MIPS score jump from a 10% weight to as much as 30% in 2019. If this happened, provider groups thought they would not be capable of maintaining compliance when the calculation weight for cost could be increased that much. Now the legislation allows for the option for the cost component of the weight calculation to be kept stagnant at 10% until 2021 (Leventhal, 2018). 
This does not mean MACRA is going to die a slow death however. Those who are supportive of the new legislation think CMS finally listened to the complaints of the physician community and made a safer environment for providers to practice while adjusting their value-based care strategies. Staying in MIPS for a longer time before switching to an AAPM is now an option and may allow for smaller organizations to adequately adjust to the new models before jumping into an AAPM. While it is understandable to allow physicians time to adjust to a program, it is not clear why they chose the cost weight to stagnate specifically. It is reasonable to think it was chosen because getting practices to reduce costs is going to be extremely difficult. However, one of the biggest draws of switching to value-based health care is the cost saving potential for everyone involved in health care That goal will not be achieved if providers are not held accountable to keep their costs down. More literature is coming out showing the current implementation of MIPS may not be achieving its desired goals. 
2.4	MIPS controversies
A big part of MIPS is the utilization of quality metrics to evaluate a provider or provider groups performance. Keeping track of these quality metrics is more feasible for large organizations because they have more resources to devote to the task. Small organizations, who often are understaffed, may not have the same resources, and face penalties for not accurately keeping track of quality measurements. Small practices’ participation in MIPS is not mandatory, but when the goal is to get all providers to focus on value, it is reasonable to wonder if this attitude only applies to large provider organizations. When small practices cannot keep up with performance measurements, they are more likely to accept being bought by a large organization. It is being observed that an increasing number of small practices are doing exactly this. According to a study published in February 2018 by Eric Roberts, et al, incentive size was not associated with differences in performance on quality metrics. The study found that large provider groups were getting higher incentive payments without necessarily delivering higher quality care (Roberts, et al, 2018). This is a huge problem for a program that is supposed to do just that. 
Not only are MIPS quality measures adding a heavy burden on some providers, but some are making the argument that the current incentive model under MIPS penalizes providers who treat poorer and sicker patients. This problems stems from the fact that MIPS does not risk adjust well. For example, when measuring hospitalizations for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions, the only patient characteristics CMS risk adjusts for is the age and sex of the patient. In reality, a patient may have a disability or long-term chronic conditions that will greatly impact the efficacy of an intervention to prevent a hospitalization (Roberts, 2018). MIPS does not adjust for this reality and makes providers who treat sicker patients vulnerable to performing poorly on their quality measures, which reduces the amount of money Medicare reimburses them. This is an area that is an absolute necessity to fix if MIPS is to be successful at accurately rewarding high value healthcare. 
3.0 	value-based healthcare Programs at Highmark Inc.
Since Highmark Inc. is the payer branch of Highmark Health and not a healthcare provider, they do not directly participate in MIPS or APMs. However, they have taken the concept of those programs, where the government incentivizes value-based care in the Medicare population, and are applying it to all member populations at Highmark. According to Jeb Dunkelberger, who is the Director of Value-Based Reimbursement Strategy and Innovation at Highmark Inc., the relationship between CMS and the health insurance industry has shifted in recent years. In the past, health insurance companies had relied on CMS to provide the standard of care. This included using conditions Medicare would cover for their patients as a baseline in deciding what they would cover for their members. Now however, the health insurance industry is taking a much larger leadership role. This is in part because as health care costs have increased, health insurance companies have been forced to become very creative in how they control costs in order to keep their premiums affordable for members. Jeb thinks the relationship between CMS and the health insurance industry now is about even, meaning the health insurance industry determines best practices just as much as CMS does. Highmark utilizes various forms of programs to practice value-based healthcare. Jeb and his team work to identify areas of the company that could be made profitable by incentivizing providers to focus their care efforts on quality instead of quantity. This model is called True Performance.
3.1	True performance
True Performance differs from CMS’s quality payment programs because it applies to all Highmark Inc. lines of business, which includes commercial, Medicare, and Medicare Advantage. This means the standards set in True Performance apply to individuals who purchase insurance for themselves, commercially, and who have insurance through Medicare or Medicare Advantage. It also serves populations in Highmark Inc’s footprint outside of Pennsylvania, including West Virginia and Delaware. It was launched in 2017 and designed to give providers a better return on investment on health plan spending by rewarding primary care physicians (PCPs) based on the quality and affordability of the care they provide their patients. It also serves as a gateway for providers to reach eligibility for more advanced payment models. In True Performance, a provider’s payment comes in two forms: a care coordination payment, and a performance-based lump sum payment. 
	The care coordination payment is a monthly payment that is determined by nationally recognized quality measures, such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) and CMS Stars program, that include comprehensive diabetes care and immunizations in the pediatric, adult, and senior populations. Using nationally recognized quality measures allows True Performance to ensure clinical validity. It is a pass-fail measure, which means if a provider meets the quality standard, they will receive the monthly payment, but if the provider does not meet the quality standard they will receive nothing. Care coordination reimbursement is paid out on a monthly basis. This model allows doctors to earn extra funds for their practice that can benefit patients while keeping patients healthy simultaneously. 
	The performance-based lump sum payment is where providers earn the bulk of their value-based payments. It combines quality measures similar to those found in care coordination with cost and utilization metrics. The lump sum payment makes up 75% of a True Performance reimbursement with cost and utilization reimbursement making up 50% and quality making up 25%. The quality lump sum reimbursement is either an annual or quarterly payout. Measures such as how often a doctor’s patient visits the emergency room and the ratio of generic to brand-name drugs were provided are factored in. This allows evaluation of how appropriate and efficient the care delivered was. 
True Performance is one of the ways that Highmark Inc. is encouraging providers to practice value-based healthcare. 75% of Highmark members have a PCP that participates in True Performance, and Highmark expects to see $50 million in annual savings from unnecessary costs across all participating employers. These statistics show the projected benefit of the program. There are also programs within True Performance that offer increased value-based incentives as a provider or provider group becomes better at delivering high value care. Such programs are called True Performance Plus and True Performance Advanced.
3.2	advanced apms
Bundled payment models are the AAPMs that Highmark is most involved in. One example is the CMS Oncology Care Model (OCM). It is one of the many new payment and delivery models that have been created to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of healthcare. It is an APM that aims to provide higher quality and more coordinated care at the same, or lower cost compared to Medicare. It was developed and is being administered by the CMS Innovation Center, and Highmark Inc. is one of only 14 payers participating in the model and plans to run the model for five years; starting July 1, 2016 and operating through June 30, 2021.  CMS hopes to support better quality care, better health, and lower costs for the cancer population by collaborating with oncologists, other providers, and commercial health plans. Part of the OCM design is to promote entire practice transformation by aligning financial incentives. This will help CMS to improve care coordination, appropriateness of care, and access for current fee-for-service Medicare patients going through chemotherapy (CMMI, 2017). 
Another bundled payment model at Highmark, Inc is the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model.  The CJR model started April 1, 2016 and is scheduled to run through December 31, 2020. It operates by designating a diagnostic related group (DRG) for joint replacement procedures with complications and a DRG for joint replacement procedures that proceed without complications. This is a very important distinction because of the massive cost differences between the two. Both of these bundled payment models contribute to value-based healthcare by incentivizing providers to take an interest in a patient’s continuum of care. Not only will providers have the potential to save money if they do it well, but it can also lead to better care for their patients.
4.0 	Maryland All-Payer Hospital Model
The state of Maryland has pursued paying for value-based healthcare in an extremely aggressive manner by implementing a global budgeting system that essentially pays hospitals to keep people out of the hospital altogether. In 2014, the state of Maryland and CMS reached an agreement called Maryland’s All-Payer Hospital Model. This model uses a payment system that regulates all hospital payments from private and government payers. Doing this holds hospitals accountable for total costs of patient care on a per-capita basis in an attempt to cut costs and require improvements in quality (Health Services Cost Review Commission, 2018). 
Maryland has a series of six performance measures that success of the program is evaluated on. Among other measures, goals consisted of reducing Medicare spending growth rates, readmissions, and hospital-acquired infections. The full list of measures and their status is depicted in Table 3. Comprehensive data was collected through 2016, and while data exists for 2017, it was not used in any of the analyses. 
While reports by the Maryland Department of Health indicate the program has been a huge success, independent studies conversely have produced mixed results. A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) found no correlation between the decreased cost growth in Maryland hospitals and the global budgeting system from 2014 to 2016. They do recommend however that evaluations over longer periods of time be done to get a more accurate representation of trends in Maryland (Roberts, et al, 2018). The successes being seen in Maryland are attracting a lot of attention, and Pennsylvania has a global budget pilot planned to help fund rural hospitals. Longer studies like the type proposed by the authors in JAMA will be vital to understand the full scope of all-payer models. However, with 58 percent of rural hospitals operating at break-even or negative margins (Murphy, Hughes, Conway 2018), hospitals in Pennsylvania may not have time to wait if they want to stay open for their patients. 
Even if the all-payer model does not end up being attainable for all states, there are aspects of Maryland’s system that could help other hospital systems provided higher-value care without implementing an all-payer model. One example is how Maryland hospitals are better coordinating care. If a person is getting treated for a chronic disease at one hospital, but in an emergency goes to another hospital, doctors treating that person may not know their medical history. It can be dangerous for someone taking medications that might react negatively when mixed with other medications. This does not happen anymore in Maryland hospitals because of a statewide Electronic Health Record system that notifies a patient’s primary hospital if they are seen somewhere else (Hancock, 2018). Maryland has also been sending clinicians out in the communities as a way to perform small interventions outside of the hospital setting. Community involvement is especially helpful in managing elderly or diabetic patients. Clinicians are often able to prevent symptoms from progressing to the point an ambulance or hospital admission is required (Hancock, 2018). Practices like these not only save hospitals money but can improve a patient’s quality of life. 

5.0 	Recommendations for the future
Speaking with Dr. Marylou Buyse, retired Senior Medical Director at Highmark Inc., she expresses hope for the future of MIPS, APMs, and value-based health care. She expects the resistance that is being seen from providers and provider groups will ease in time because there is always resistance when the status quo is disturbed. In time, providers will see that a value-based healthcare model can actually be lucrative for themselves and their businesses while making their jobs easier too. Transition periods are often difficult, but if providers can commit for long enough to start realizing the benefits before they stop participating, everyone will be better off. 
It is additionally recommended that there be more consistency required of newly implemented value-based reimbursement models. Highmark, Inc was not the first health insurance company to utilize reimbursement programs such as MIPS, APMs, and True Performance, and will certainly not be the last. As an increasing number of payers implement these programs, customization increases as well. Some strategies that work for one payer’s provider network simply will not work for another, which leads to changes that make the model work for that organization. While customization for different organizations is sometimes necessary for a successful model, it also makes it difficult for widespread adoption. It is recommended that new value-based reimbursement models be required to operate on the same criteria that CMS uses. This will help to simplify the administration process, make it easier for providers to adopt, and ultimately generate more money for both the payer and the provider. 	
In light of studies being published that call into question the effectiveness of MIPS, such as the examples outlined in this paper, it is recommended that more be done to review the efficacy of how the government and private payers incentivize value-based healthcare. Risk scoring methods need to be fair, and not punish providers for treating sicker populations. Improving this while listening to provider complaints regarding the burden of reporting an increasing amount of quality metrics can only better MIPS. Federal legislation is almost never perfect the first time, and this is especially true when it comes to healthcare.





Table 1. Acronyms Referenced
AAPM: Advanced Alternative Payment Model	GDP: Gross Domestic Product
ACA: Affordable Care Act	JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association
ACO: Accountable Care Organization	MACRA: Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act
APM: Alternative Payment Model	MIPS: Merit-Based Incentive Payment Systems
BPCI: Bundled Payments for Care Improvement	NCQA: National Committee for Quality Assurance
CHIP: Children's Health Insurance Program	NEJM New England Journal of Medicine
CJR: Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement	OCM: Oncology Care Model
CMS: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services	PCP: Primary Care Physician
COPD: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease	PQRS: Physician Quality Reporting System
CPC: Comprehensive Primary Care 	QPP: Quality Payment Programs
DHHS: Department of Health and Human Services	SGR: Sustainable Growth Rate

Table 2. MIPS Performance Categories





Table 3. Maryland All-Payer Performance Goals

(Health Services Cost Review Commission, 2018)
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